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Introduction and summary
Companies borrow from investors for a variety of reasons. 
For example, current sales revenue may not be enough 
to pay suppliers or employees; companies may wish to 
make long-term investments by buying new equipment 
or constructing new buildings; or they may want to have 
access to credit to deal with unforeseen circumstances. 
Large companies have a wide menu of choices for bor-
rowing funds, including issuing new stock or bonds. 
Small companies tend to have a smaller set of options. 
Because such companies may also be younger than large 
companies and, thus, have a shorter track record, or be-
cause they may be more reliant on the performance of 
a small number of key employees, these firms will face 
more difficulty in conveying their value to the broad class 
of investors who participate in the bond or stock markets. 
Small firms are thus often privately held (that is, 
their stocks are not traded on public exchanges). These 
private firms likely rely on bank loans for much of their 
borrowing, as banks may be better able to spend the 
resources to investigate the firms’ prospects.1 Such small, 
bank-dependent firms are vulnerable to problems in 
the banking system. Indeed, a number of researchers 
argue that monetary policy and other economic shocks 
that impact the supply of credit flow through banks to 
bank-dependent firms.2
Although banks make many traditional spot loans, 
in which the whole amount of the loan is provided to 
the firm, much business lending takes the form of a credit 
line, also known as a loan under commitment. In a loan 
under commitment, the bank agrees to provide funds to 
the firm as needed up to a pre-specified limit, at mutu-
ally agreed-upon terms and over a fixed period. As of 
the end of the second quarter of 2010, commercial banks 
held $1.1 trillion in commercial and industrial loans on 
their books, but had about $2 trillion in unused com-
mitments (that is, the portion of the credit line not yet 
used) on business credit lines.3 
The market for loans under commitment is impor-
tant because it represents a large portion of business 
lending and the majority of small business finance. In 
addition, loans under commitment may be one channel 
through which monetary policy and credit shocks are 
transmitted to the broader economy. However, a lack 
of available data has made it difficult to study loans un-
der commitment or small business lending more broadly 
defined. Standard government data sources on banking, 
such as the Reports of Condition and Income, also 
known as the Call Reports (produced by the Federal 
Financial Institutions Examination Council, or FFIEC), 
or the Federal Reserve System’s weekly bank credit 
data (H.8 statistical release), do not break out business 
lending by the size of the borrowing firm. Publicly traded 
firms are required to issue quarterly reports on their 
balance sheet, including details of their financing, but 
private firms do not have such requirements.
In this article, we use a panel data set from a 
large bank to examine the behavior of loans under 
commitment made to privately held firms. The data set 
contains all of the characteristics of the credit lines and 
all of the financial information about the firms that is 
available to the bank. 
As with any lending market, the interest rate on the 
loan under commitment, the collateral and other re-
quirements for the credit line, and the amount of the 72 2Q/2011, Economic Perspectives
line are jointly determined by the intersection of the 
bank’s supply and the firm’s demand. In the absence 
of further identifying assumptions, we will not know 
whether these prices and quantities change over time 
or differ across firms because of changes in factors driv-
ing supply or factors affecting demand for these loans. 
However, our data set provides us with information 
on both the amounts of credit that firms requested and 
the amounts granted. Restricting our analysis to those 
cases in which the amount requested is equal to the 
amount granted helps us to ensure that observed differ-
ences in prices and quantities across firms reflect  
differences in firms’ demand for credit rather than  
differences in banks’ willingness to supply credit. Still, 
no attempt to solve the problem of separating supply 
and demand is perfect, and some of our results on the 
determinants of credit demand may partly capture 
factors that affect credit supply instead.
Economists have hypothesized a number of reasons 
why companies might choose to borrow via credit lines 
rather than spot loans, including the need to hedge against 
the possibility of a sudden deterioration in their own 
creditworthiness and a desire for flexibility to be able 
to quickly take up new investment opportunities. We 
look at some of the factors that affect these and other 
reasons underlying the demand for lines under commit-
ment. We find that increases in fees paid on the com-
mitment and the interest rate charged to the firm lead 
to large reductions in the size of lines obtained—in 
other words, the demand curve does indeed slope down-
ward with the cost of the loan. Increases in fees for 
overcharging the lines raise line demand (as firms pre-
sumably try to avoid such overcharges by borrowing 
more at the outset). Increases in mean profit growth—
a proxy for future investment opportunities—lead to 
very large increases in credit lines, while increases in 
the volatility of profit growth or in cash flow (a source 
of internal funds) cause, respectively, large and mod-
erate decreases in the size of lines; these results sug-
gest that access to funds for flexibility is an important 
motive, as described in the model developed by Martin 
and Santomero (1997). We find weak evidence against 
models in which loans under commitment help firms 
to hedge against the possibility that their own credit 
ratings may decline; we estimate that the quantity of 
credit demanded is negatively related to measures of 
firm risk.
If firms do use credit lines to enhance their flexibility, 
many of the same factors that affect their demand for 
the size of the line will also affect their usage of the line.  
Firms will not want to use all of their lines, as that 
would leave them at risk of not being able to fund new 
opportunities. We test this idea by examining whether 
line utilization responds to the same variables that in-
fluence line demand. With the exception of upfront fees, 
all variables affect line utilization in the same way as 
they do line size.
In the next section, we summarize the academic 
literature on business credit lines. We then discuss 
our data set and the setup for our estimation. Finally, 
we present our results and discuss their implications.
The economics of loan commitments
When a firm takes out a loan under commitment (or 
credit line), the bank commits to providing up to some 
amount of credit to the firm over a specified period. 
The firm is not obligated to take out the full amount of 
the credit line at once and, indeed, usually does not 
do so even over the entire duration of the contract. 
The bank charges the firm for setting up the line (known 
as the commitment fee); it may also charge other fees 
or penalties if the firm exceeds the line limit or other-
wise breaks the contract. Both spot loans and credit 
lines usually require the firm to post collateral.
Firms face some trade-offs in choosing between 
spot loans and credit lines. For example, the existence 
of the commitment fee, holding everything else equal, 
makes a credit line more costly to a firm than a spot 
loan. The economics and finance literature provides 
several competing views on the relative merits of spot 
loans and loans under commitment and how firms 
choose between them. 
According to one view, loan commitments allow 
firms to hedge against any deterioration in their own 
creditworthiness over the period of the loan.4 If a firm 
suffers such a deterioration, it may have trouble getting 
a new spot loan. Having a partly unused line of credit 
would provide the firm with needed funds in this case. 
This option would only be available if the bank was 
not able to use the deterioration as an excuse to cut 
the size of the firm’s credit line. 
A second body of work argues that loan commit-
ments help private firms hedge against decreases in 
the aggregate supply of credit, or credit crunches.5 
Firms may be concerned that a decrease in the supply 
of credit by the banking industry—such as what occurred 
in the aftermath of the savings and loan crisis of the 
early 1990s—will leave them less able to borrow. Of 
course, a banking industry crisis may coincide with a 
period of declining creditworthiness. Both of these 
phenomena may have been at work during the recent 
financial crisis. In the third quarter of 2008, commer-
cial bank lending to businesses expanded rapidly while 
the fraction of loan commitments unused dropped, sug-
gesting that businesses were drawing down their credit 
lines during a time when activity in other corporate 73 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
credit markets, such as that for commercial paper, was 
rapidly diminishing.6
A third view contends that loan commitments are 
attractive to both firms and banks because they help solve 
information problems that make it difficult for firms to 
borrow on the spot markets for loans or commercial 
paper.7 According to this view, some firms may be par-
ticularly difficult to value, perhaps because they have 
assets that have illiquid markets or because the firms 
are small and rely heavily on the work of a few key in-
dividuals. Such firms will have difficulty borrowing 
in the bond and commercial paper markets since it will 
be difficult to convey the riskiness of the securities to 
the broad class of investors who participate in such mar-
kets. Banks are better able to investigate the quality of 
the firm and monitor its behavior. Credit lines also 
provide more protection to the bank than spot loans 
because the bank may have the option of cutting the 
unused portion of the line if circumstances change.
A final view argues that the relative speed and flexi-
bility offered by credit lines enables firms to take advan-
tage of investment opportunities they might miss if they 
had to take the time to obtain approval for spot-market 
loans (see Martin and Santomero, 1997). This flexibility 
makes the extra costs (in the form of fees and higher 
interest rates) of loans under commitment worthwhile 
to the firm.
These reasons are not mutually exclusive; it is likely 
that all of them contribute, to some degree, to devel-
opments in the market for credit lines. The empirical 
evidence on these explanations is a bit mixed, in part 
because of the data availability difficulties alluded to 
in the introduction. Also, with a variety of explanations, 
it is difficult to estimate the contribution of any indi-
vidual one (and many studies have focused on evalu-
ating one of many possible explanations). Several authors 
have found that macroeconomic developments in the 
market for bank loans appear to affect the quantity and 
price of loans, providing support for the second view: 
Borrowers take out credit lines because they are con-
cerned about decreases in the aggregate supply of credit.8 
Shockley and Thakor (1997) find some evidence for 
the third view: Borrowers that appear to be harder  
to value (because they are less well known or have 
assets that are difficult to value) tend to use credit lines 
rather than other nonbank forms of finance, such as 
commercial paper. 
Ham and Melnik (1987) look at the determinants 
of usage of credit lines (that is, conditional on having 
obtained a loan under commitment, what fraction of 
that loan is used). Using a sample of 90 nonfinancial 
corporations, the authors find that credit line usage is 
positively related to total sales, borrowed reserves, and 
whether collateral is used to secure the loan; and it is 
negatively related to interest rate costs (specifically, risk 
premiums and commitment fees).
Much of this empirical work has attempted to 
identify what determines banks’ willingness to supply 
credit. The papers that have focused on the demand for 
credit have used data on larger, publicly traded corpora-
tions. As we discuss in the next section, our data allow 
us to study smaller firms that are not publicly traded and, 
we argue, to analyze demand for credit by these firms. 
Data and empirical strategy
Data
Our unique data set comes from a large commercial 
bank that issued lines of credit to both publicly traded 
and private firms. For this article, we restrict our sam-
ple to private firms with fewer than 500 employees. 
Our data set has independently audited quarterly balance 
sheet data on the firms from the second quarter of 1998 
through the fourth quarter of 2002 and monthly loan 
performance information from the first quarter of 2001 
through the fourth quarter of 2002.
Tables 1 and 2 provide some summary statistics for 
the firms in our sample. The top panel of table 1 gives 
the distribution of firms across industries and the bot-
tom panel gives the distribution across geographical 
locations. The firms are distributed across seven broadly 
defined classes of industry, ranging from manufactur-
ing to retail and wholesale trade to services, and are 
located in five northeastern states. 
Table 2 provides means and standard deviations 
(a measure of dispersion) on other firm characteristics 
and balance sheet information. The mean age of the 
firms is about ten years. The firms on average hold 
just above $2 million in total assets and have about 
$630,000 in working capital. The firms in our sample 
have relatively robust annual growth rates of profits and 
sales, of about 22 percent and 25 percent, respectively. 
On a scale of 1 to 8, with 1 being the least risky, the 
average firm receives a rating of about 5. The remain-
ing entries in the table are characteristics of the firms’ 
credit lines. The firms incur an average of about $1,800 
in fees, paid upfront, to take out the credit line. They 
pay an average of 8.41 percent plus a risk premium of 
39 basis points on any amount drawn from the credit 
line and a penalty rate of about 2 percent on any amount 
drawn above the stated line amount. To obtain credit 
lines, 95 percent of the firms in our sample used col-
lateral to secure the line commitment, with about 19 
percent using deposits at the bank and 76 percent using 
business assets as collateral. The average line com-
mitment for our sample firms is a little under $1 mil-
lion. Over the two-year period covered by our sample, 74 2Q/2011, Economic Perspectives
TaBlE 1 
Distribution of firm characteristics
Industry   Percent
Mining and construction  8
Manufacturing (textile, food, tobacco,  
  furniture, printing, petroleum)  14
Manufacturing (rubber, leather, metal,  
  machinery, equipment, electronics)  19
Transportation  2
Trade  21
Finance, insurance, and real estate  24
Services (hotels, personal and business  
  services, auto)  3





Rhode Island  7
New York  39
New Jersey  6
Notes: The total number of firms in our sample is 637. These 
distributions are at account origination.
Source: Panel data set from a large bank.
TaBlE 2 
Summary statistics
    Standard 
Variable  Mean  error
Credit line commitmenta   997,274  993,012
Utilizationb (two-year average)  51.88  54.23
Commitment feea   1,829  331
Interest rate on takedownb  8.41  1.44
Risk premium spreadb  0.39  0.54
Overcharge fee spreadb  2.01  5.11
Net profit growthb  22.48  6.03
Net sales growthb  25.32  2.94
Total assets growthb  12.91  59.34
Risk ratings   5.01  0.64
Net cash flowa   178,090  131,299
Working capitala   631,034  590,953
Years in business  10.03  5.78
Total assetsa   2,009,239  1,693,984




Source: Authors’ calculations based on panel data set from  
a large bank.
firms on average draw down a little over half of their 
credit line.
Empirical strategy
Although we can use our data to look at correlations 
between the quantity and price of credit lines and oth-
er firm and industry characteristics, in the absence of 
further assumptions we can’t be sure whether those 
relationships are driven by changes in the supply of 
loans or changes in the demand for such loans.
However, one piece of information we observe on 
the loans helps us identify the difference between supply 
and demand: We see both the amount of the loan asked 
for by the firm and the amount granted by the bank. 
We argue that if we restrict our analysis to cases where 
the amounts asked for and granted are the same, the 
resulting differences in prices and quantities across 
firms will reflect differences in demand for commit-
ment lines rather than supply. You can think of this as 
firms submitting an application for a given line com-
mitment where the price is posted by the bank. To see 
this, consider two firms that happened to demand the 
same amount of credit, but differed in some character-
istic that led the bank to be less willing to lend to one 
firm than to the other. Then we should observe that for 
one firm, the amount supplied is equal to the amount 
demanded; but for the other, the amount supplied would 
be less than the amount initially demanded. Thus, the 
differences in the amount (and the price) transacted 
would be attributable in that case to differences in fac-
tors affecting loan supply. In contrast, by looking at 
cases where the amount demanded is equal to the amount 
supplied, we can be more confident that any differences 
in quantities (and prices) across firms are attributable 
to differences in the demand for credit across those firms. 
Making this restriction reduces our sample from the 
original data set of 1,147 firms to 637 firms. Since no 
identification scheme is perfect, we acknowledge that 
some of the factors we identify here as contributing to 
credit demand may also be contributing to credit supply.
By allowing us to estimate the determinants of 
firms’ demand for loans under commitment, this ap-
proach also permits us to determine the degree to which 
some of the hypotheses about firms’ demand for credit 
lines are applicable. To some extent, we can evaluate 
the first and third hypotheses—that firms use credit lines 
to hedge against deteriorations in their own credit-
worthiness or to solve problems with informational 
asymmetries inherent to other forms of borrowing—
by incorporating risk measures of the firm. It is a bit 
difficult in our sample to determine the role of the sec-
ond hypothesis—insurance against aggregate declines 
in consumer credit. Although our sample period does 
cover the aftermath of a recession, the relative tightness 
of corporate credit during this period is not as great as 
it was during the periods studied by other authors. We 
can partially test the fourth hypothesis—that firms take 
out credit lines for their flexibility—by including proxies 
for the firm’s likely need for funds.75 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago



























Qi is the size of the credit line normalized by firm assets; 
we do this normalization because credit line demand 
may be very different for different sizes of firm. 
Pricei is a set of contract pricing components, in-
cluding fees charged for setting up the line, fees for 
overdrawing, the interest rate charged on funds drawn, 
and the risk premium spread. 
NetFundNeedsi consists of measures of the mean 
and standard deviation of the firm’s net need for exter-
nal funds, cash flow, and working capital. Martin and 
Santomero’s (1997) model suggests that these param-
eters are two important determinants of the size of credit 
lines. Since net need for funding is not directly observ-
able, we need to proxy for its mean and standard devi-
ation. The need for external funds will be greater the 
more investment opportunities are available. If firms 
are persistently able to find good investment opportu-
nities, they will be persistently profitable. Thus, we use 
the mean and standard deviation of net profits over our 
sample as our proxy for the mean and standard devia-
tion of net credit needs. We include cash flow and work-
ing capital because externally borrowed funds are needed 
less when more internal funds are available.
Riski is the bank’s risk rating for firm i. 
Collaterali consists of two dummy variables—
one for the use of deposits at the bank and one for the 
use of business assets. Collateral should matter for two 
reasons. First, the posting of collateral helps reduce the 
riskiness of the loan to the bank, and thus has some bear-
ing on the first and third hypotheses for credit ration-
ing. Second, collateral can be considered as one of the 
determinants of pricing for the loans. Because collat-
eral has this dual role, we break it out separately from 
the risk and pricing terms above.
We also control for other firm-level characteristics 
that might affect demand for funds. Agei represents the 
number of years that firm i has been in business and 
the number of years squared. If a younger firm faces 
more uncertainty about its growth prospects than an 
older firm, it is more likely to commit to a smaller line 
and use less of its line commitment. We also include 
dummy variables for the firm’s industry (Industryi ) and 
the state in which the firm is headquartered (Statei ).
Although we have argued that we control for one 
potential problem—the difficulty in separating supply 
from demand—we may still face another problem. It 
may be the case that omitted variables that affect loan 
supply happen to be correlated with the regressors, 
thereby biasing the coefficients. However, since we 
include all the variables observed by the financial in-
stitution, we are confident that the errors in the regression 
are not related to firm characteristics that might affect 
the bank’s supply of loans to the firm. Our approach in 
this regard is the same as that taken by Adams, Einav, 
and Levin (2009) for auto loans and Karlan and Zinman 
(2009) for other consumer loans.
Results
Table 3 presents the model estimates. Firms that 
have to pay higher upfront commitment fees, higher 
risk premium spreads, or higher usage fees commit to 
a smaller credit line, while firms that face a higher penalty 
for overdrawing their line commit to a larger credit line. 
All of the effects are economically large and statisti-
cally significant and jointly suggest that the quantity 
demanded is decreasing in the various pricing terms of 
the loan—that is, the demand curve slopes downward.
An increase of 1 percent in upfront commitment 
fees decreases the line commitment by about 4 percent—
a surprisingly large amount, given the relatively small 
average size of the fees. A 1 percentage point increase 
in the overcharge fee spread increases the amount of 
the credit line by more than 6 percent. Since 1 percent-
age point is large relative to the average penalty, but is 
well within the 5 percentage points standard deviation 
for that variable, normal changes in the spread lead to 
very large changes in the size of the credit line. A 1 per-
centage point increase in the interest rate—an amount 
slightly less than one standard deviation for that vari-
able—leads to about a 10 percent decline in the initial 
credit line, while an increase in the risk premium spread 
of 1 percentage point (about two standard deviations) 
reduces the initial credit line by about 18 percent.
Proxies for net funding needs also have a very 
large impact on credit line demand. An increase in 
average net profit growth, which we would expect to 
be positively correlated with future need for funds, of 
1 percent raises credit demand by about 16 percent. An 
increase of 1 percent in the standard deviation of net 
profit growth (which we would similarly expect to be 
positively related with the standard deviation of net 
funding needs) lowers credit demand by about 15 per-
cent. An increase in net cash flow of 1 percent lowers 
demand for credit by about 1.75 percent. Although this 
result has the right sign (since internal funds should 
reduce the net need for funds), its magnitude is small. 
Contrary to our expectations, having more working 
capital paradoxically raises credit line demand. This 
result may arise because working capital may be a 76 2Q/2011, Economic Perspectives
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Log (commitment fee)  −   4.02**
  (1.02)
Overcharge fee spread   6.42**
  (2.81)
Interest rate  −10.39**
  (4.09)
Risk premium spread  −17.83**
  (7.37)
Net funding needs 
Mean net profit growth  15.88**
  (6.73)
Standard deviation of net profit growth  −14.67**
  (5.93)
Log (net cash flow)  −1.75
  (1.21)
Log (working capital)  7.80*
  (3.10)
Risk 
Risk rating  −1.59*
  (0.79)
Collateral 
Collateral (deposits)  14.83*
  (5.92)
Collateral (business assets)  4.17
  (2.63)
Firm characteristics included 
Years in business  Yes
SIC dummies  Yes
State dummies  Yes
Adjusted R-squared  0.68
Number of observations  637
       *Denotes statistical significance at a 95% confidence level.
  **Denotes statistical significance at a 99% confidence level.
Notes: This table reports the results of an ordinary least squares 
regression of credit line amount normalized by firm assets on 
measures of price, net funding needs, risk, collateral, age, and 
firm characteristics (not reported). Heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. The price measures consist 
of commitment fees (log thousands of dollars), overcharge fee 
spread, interest rate, and risk premium spread (all in percentage 
points). Net funding needs are represented by the mean and 
standard deviation of net profit growth (percent growth), net cash 
flow, and working capital (both log thousands of dollars). Risk 
rating is measured on a scale of 1–8, where 8 represents the 
highest risk. Collateral is measured by a dummy variable for 
each type. All percentage and growth rate figures are expressed  
as decimals. SIC indicates standard industrial classification.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on panel data set from a  
large bank. 
predictor of future funding needs.9 The net funding needs 
variables, as a group, have a larger effect on credit 
demand than any of the other explanatory variables, 
suggesting that the fourth hypothesis for what deter-
mines demand for loans under commitment—Martin 
and Santomero’s (1997) model of firms’ demand for 
flexibility in financing—plays an important role.
An increase of 1 point on the risk rating (on an 
8-point scale of increasing risk) lowers credit demand 
by over 1.5 percent. From Campbell (1978) and Hawkins 
(1982), we would have expected that firms fearing  
reductions in credit ratings would have demanded more 
credit. Our findings here do not support that idea, if we 
assume that already riskier firms are more concerned 
about deterioration. However, it is possible that rela-
tively less risky firms fear credit deterioration more, or 
pay relatively higher costs when their credit deteriorates. 
The use of collateral, not surprisingly, increases the 
demand for credit, more so when collateral is in the form 
of deposits rather than in the form of business assets. 
We also include, but do not report in the tables, 
other measures of firm characteristics that might affect 
credit demand. Younger firms hold larger lines of credit, 
perhaps because they fear deterioration in creditworthi-
ness; each additional year in business increases credit 
demand by about 2 percentage points. Firms whose 
industry classification places them in the finance, in-
surance, and real estate; trade; or service sectors have 
larger credit lines than those in mining and construc-
tion or manufacturing. There is no substantial variation 
in credit line size by state location.
Credit line utilization
Conditional on having chosen the size of the credit 
line, firms’ draws on the line should reflect the arrival 
of investment opportunities. But when firms must re-
peatedly choose lines, line usage should also influence 
the timing of such choices and the size of the line. If 
firms employ credit lines to give them the flexibility to 
take advantage of investment opportunities that would 
otherwise disappear, they should take out a new line 
before the current one is used up. We frequently ob-
serve this in our data: Firms convert the unused portion 
of the credit line into a spot loan and take out a new 
line of credit.
Since utilization and the size of the credit line may 
therefore be jointly determined, we run the same regres-
sion as in table 3, replacing the size of the credit line 
with utilization (measured as a two-year average of the 
total amount drawn by the firm relative to the total 
credit line amount). The results, reported in table 4, 
are generally in line with expectations and the results 
reported in table 3.
We find that higher upfront commitment fees are 
associated with greater usage of credit lines; a 1 percent 
increase in such fees raises utilization by about 4 percent. 
This may reflect a selection effect: Firms willing to pay 
higher fees to establish credit lines may also be in in-
dustries in which investment opportunities arise more 77 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
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Log (commitment fee)  3.81**
  (1.45)
Overcharge fee spread  2.03*
  (1.02)
Interest rate  −4.74**
  (1.18)
Risk premium spread  −7.07*
  (3.47)
Net funding needs 
Mean net profit growth  10.57*
  (4.72)
Standard deviation of net profit growth  −11.42*
  (5.61)
Log (net cash flow)  −1.04
  (0.69)
Log (working capital)  −1.89*
  (0.88)
Risk 
Risk rating  −2.93*
  (1.29)
Collateral 
Collateral (deposits)  7.19
  (5.92)
Collateral (business assets)  3.74
  (6.93)
Firm characteristics included 
Years in business  Yes
SIC dummies  Yes
State dummies  Yes
Adjusted R-squared  0.37
Number of observations  637
       *Denotes statistical significance at a 95% confidence level.
  **Denotes statistical significance at a 99% confidence level.
Notes: This table reports the results of an OLS regression of credit 
line usage (a two-year average of the percentage of the credit line 
used) on measures of price, net funding needs, risk, collateral, age, 
and firm characteristics (not reported). Heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. The price measures consist of 
commitment fees (log thousands of dollars), overcharge fee spread, 
interest rate, and risk premium spread (all in percentage points). 
Net funding needs are represented by the mean and standard deviation 
of net profit growth (percent growth), net cash flow, and working 
capital (both log thousands of dollars). Risk rating is measured on  
a scale of 1–8, where 8 represents the highest risk. Collateral is 
measured by a dummy variable for each type. All percentage and 
growth rate figures are expressed as decimals. SIC indicates 
standard industrial classification.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on panel data set from a  
large bank.
frequently. Overcharge fees have a small but statistically 
significant effect on usage. Increases in interest rates and 
risk premium spreads lead to lower utilization rates, but 
the effects are much smaller than those for credit line size.
The average and standard deviation of net profit 
growth affect utilization as expected—the former  
increasing it (by 10 percent for each 1 percentage point 
increase); the latter decreasing it (by 11 percent for each 
1 percentage point increase). Cash flow and working 
capital have negligible effects on usage, possibly be-
cause, conditional on having obtained the line, it is less 
costly for firms to use external funds (which must be 
paid for whether they are used or not) than internal funds.
Riskier firms use smaller amounts of their credit 
lines; each one-step increase in risk category decreases 
line usage by about 3 percent. This may be consistent 
with the hypothesis that riskier firms are reluctant to use 
their credit for fear that credit will become more costly 
or unavailable if their condition deteriorates further.
Collateral has a large but statistically insignificant 
effect on usage. There is no economically or statistically 
significant variation in utilization by age of the firm, 
industrial classification, or state location.
Conclusion
Firms borrow in order to undertake investment or 
to insulate themselves from macroeconomic shocks, 
among other reasons. Thus, a better understanding of 
firm borrowing not only allows us to better model in-
dividual firm behavior, but also may enhance our abili-
ty to understand business cycles. Credit lines are an 
important source of borrowing, especially for small 
firms. There are several competing explanations for 
the existence and use of credit lines: hedging against 
deterioration in creditworthiness, hedging against aggre-
gate reduction in credit, solving informational prob-
lems that make it hard for firms to borrow in other 
markets, or providing speed and flexibility to enable 
firms to take advantage of investment opportunities. 
Although a number of researchers have looked at the 
determinants of the supply of credit lines, few have 
looked at demand; those that have looked at demand 
have analyzed publicly traded firms, for which data 
are more readily available.
In this article, we look at the demand for credit 
lines by privately held firms. Our findings are consis-
tent with predictions derivable from several models 
of credit line usage. Firms facing higher upfront com-
mitment fees, risk premium spreads, or usage fees have 
smaller credit lines, while those with higher overdraft 
fees have larger ones. Firms with greater profit growth 
in the past have larger credit lines, while those with 
more internal funds or higher volatility in profit growth 
have smaller credit lines. The results for line utilization 
are quite similar. We also find that firms rarely exhaust 
their credit lines; rather, they convert the unused por-
tions of their credit lines to spot loans and take out new 
lines. This last finding suggests there is a dynamic in-
teraction between line size and usage; it would be of 78 2Q/2011, Economic Perspectives
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interest to model this relationship in order to develop 
new predictions and to link the estimates of firm bor-
rowing behavior more directly to models of economic 
fluctuations. Finally, although we have tried to separate 
the determinants of demand from those of supply, we 
have likely not done so perfectly. Thus, some of the 
effects we identify may also reflect factors that affect 
loan supply.
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